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When a new technology consists of sequences of innovations that culminate in a final 
consumer product, the balance between successive innovators is one of the main concerns 
in the design of the patent system. While intertemporal aspects of incentive are critical in 
this environment of sequential innovations, time plays a minor role in existing literature on 
dynamic models. By focusing on the incentives of follow-on innovators who 
commercialize an initial invention, this study examines the dynamic implications of the 
patent instrument (e.g., patent life) via a positive analysis. It shows that a long patent life 
may encourage innovation incentives and increase social welfare, contrary to existing 
arguments that argue that long patent life always discourages the incentive for subsequent 
innovations. This study also examines the implications of finite patent system in different 
market structures. 
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ECONOMICS OF PATENTING A RESEARCH TOOL 
 
Bonwoo Koo 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
The current revolutions in biotechnology and information technology consist of 
sequences of innovations that culminate in a final consumer product. The concurrent 
revolution in intellectual property rights has resulted in patenting of elements of these 
innovation sequences. In biomedical science, for example, new research tools that play a 
critical role in subsequent innovations (e.g., cell lines, cloning tools, reagents, etc.) are 
being patented. One policy issue in this environment is how to provide an adequate 
incentive to develop research tools that can open up new lines of innovation. Another 
fundamental issue is how to promote dissemination of these tools for further follow-on 
developments by subsequent innovators.
3  
The balance of incentives between successive innovations has been the main 
concern in the recent dynamic literature on the design of the patent system. Some studies 
emphasize the positive effect of patenting on early innovation and support a strong patent 
system (e.g., Kitch 1977; Scotchmer 1996), while others express considerable concern over 
the potential negative effects of patents on subsequent innovations and propose weaker 
patent protection to reduce the problem of high transaction costs associated with licensing 
                                                 
1 Post-doctoral Fellow, Environment and Production Technology Division, International Food Policy 
Ressearch Institute. 
2 Professor, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California, Berkeley 
3 Considerable concerns have been expressed on the limited access to the proprietary research tools in 
practice. See NIH (1998) for examples.  
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with multiple patent holders (see, for example, Merges and Nelson 1990; Heller and 
Eisenberg 1998). 
Paradoxically, in most dynamic models time plays a minor role (Green and 
Scotchmer 1995; Chang 1995; O’Donoghue 1998). They typically focus on the size and 
division of innovation induced by varying degrees of patent breadth or scope, without 
much consideration on the relation between patent life and the date of introduction of 
subsequent innovations. Changes in patent life induce complex dynamic incentives: 
changes in patent life affect the period of overhang during which the follow-on innovator 
pays royalty fees to the previous patent holder, which in turn changes the date of 
introduction of subsequent innovations with different expected profit from the innovation. 
This study investigates the implications of patenting when innovations form a 
dynamic sequence. Arguments for patent reform based on existing dynamic models may be 
premature if the implications of the currently practiced patent system itself are not 
properly appreciated in the context of a dynamic research sequence. This paper considers 
the sequence in which an initial invention is an input essential to a subsequent innovation 
that in turn lowers the cost of producing a consumer good. In a two-stage innovation 
model, this study analyzes the role that finite patent life can play in advancing (or 
delaying) the introduction of the second, follow-on innovation, by assuming an inelastic 
first invention. 
The standard analysis on the justification of a finite patent life is based on the static 
Nordhaus (1969) model of an independent, stand-alone innovation that reduces the 
production cost of a consumer good. His derivation of an optimal finite patent life balances 
the gain from appropriability of the value of the innovation during the period of monopoly  
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granted by the patent against the associated deadweight loss. The optimal life is sensitive 
to the parameters of the system including the size of innovation, the shape of the 
innovation production function, and particularly, the elasticity of demand for a consumer 
good. His model assumes no competition in the innovation process so that the lone 
innovator is guaranteed the receipt of a patent if she succeeds in achieving an innovation.  
Two lines of research have been developed since the Nordhaus’ seminal paper. One 
line of research focuses on the roles of patent instruments, along the line of the Nordhaus’ 
original model of a monopolistic innovation process. Several studies (Gilbert and Shapiro 
1990; Klemperer 1990; Gallini 1992) examined the optimal mix of patent breadth and 
length that provides a pre-determined level of reward to the patentee in a model of an 
independent innovation.
4 Subsequent studies of a two-stage model (Green and Scotchmer 
1995; Chang 1995) and a multi-stage model (Cadot and Lipman 1995; Horowitz and Lai 
1996) analyze the effect of patent breadth and life on the incentive for innovation and 
social welfare, without much regard to competitive innovation race. All of these models 
assume either a single firm pursuing an innovation or two firms competing for a patent 
where one firm merely plays a minor role as an imitative threat. 
The other line of research from the Nordhaus model emphasizes the role of 
competitive patent race in the innovation process. By introducing competitive innovation 
race, Kamien and Schwartz (1974) derive an optimal patent life that is longer than that of 
Nordhaus and DeBrock (1985) and Denicolo (1999) derive a shorter life than Nordhaus’. 
                                                 
4 By treating the breadth of a patent as a decision variable, Gilbert and Shapiro argue that a narrow patent 
with infinite life is optimal, while Klemperer reaches a different result. Gallini shows that if imitators can 
invent around a patent, a short and broad patent is optimal.  
 
4 
This focus on competitive patent race subsequently extends to a two-stage model 
(Denicolo 2000) and a multi-stage model (O’Donoghue 1998). However, unrestricted 
R&D competition in the innovation race can result in the rent dissipation problem familiar 
in open-access resource models (Gordon 1954), and this affects social welfare and optimal 
patent system. Wright (1983;1984) demonstrates that the social loss associated with rent 
dissipation by competitive innovators can dominate the deadweight loss from monopoly 
awarded by a patent; more responsive research tends to imply that welfare-maximizing 
patents life is shorter.  
In this paper, we focus on the case where the search for the second innovation is 
competitive and the timing of innovation is responsive to the rate of research. We first 
show that a long patent life might not hinder subsequent innovation when the R&D cost of 
the innovation is not sufficiently high (proposition 1). The possibility of licensing the first 
invention within its patent period makes this result possible. This result contrasts to 
existing studies on sequential innovations that argue that long patent life always 
discourages the incentive for subsequent innovations. However, this result does not 
necessarily imply that the optimal patent life is infinite. A finite patent life can encourage 
the search for subsequent innovations that would be blocked under infinite patent life, and 
proposition 2 shows that the optimal patent life is finite in all range of cost. Another 
important result of this study is that social welfare is in general not sensitive to patent life, 
and a finite patent system is self-selective due to firms’ ability to adjust the timing of 
investment. Finally, we show that if competitive researchers dissipate their rents in racing 
for patents, endowing a potential innovator with monopoly power might be welfare 
improving when the R&D cost is very low.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a two-stage sequential 
innovation model amenable to analytical assessment, and discusses licensing equilibrium 
and efficient royalty for licensing a patent for use by a subsequent innovator. Assuming a 
first innovation has already been made, section 3 analyzes the incentive for the second 
innovation in a competitive innovation race and derives an optimal patent life that 
maximizes social welfare. The implications of a finite patent life and the importance of 
licensing arrangement are considered in this dynamic context. Section 4 considers the case 
where only a single firm can participate in the second innovation and compares the results 
with the competitive case of Section 3. Section 5 extends the model by relaxing some of 
assumptions, and concluding remarks follow in section 6. 
 
2.  A TWO-STAGE INNOVATION MODEL  
2.1. ASSUMPTIONS 
We adopt a highly stylized model with polar assumptions to focus on the issues that 
are of interest here. Consistent with other sequential models, we consider the case in which 
the second innovation (“application”) builds upon a patented first invention.
5 The first 
invention is a “research tool” that does not impart any direct externality other than that it 
enables the search for the second innovation. To analyze the incentive for the second 
innovation in more detail, we assume the first invention is inelastically supplied. Initially, 
we assume that a successful first inventor cannot compete for the second innovation, so she 
must patent her invention to receive licensing revenue from a subsequent innovator. A 
                                                 
5 We follow the classic differentiation between technological invention and commercial innovation, 
addressed by Schumpeter (1939). He defined an innovation as the commercial application or adoption of an  
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simple example is an independent researcher who receives a patent for a research tool (say, 
a screening method to identify novel compounds) but does not have the capacity to 
develop and commercialize its invention (say, into a new drug).  
There is no fixed cost involved for the second innovation, so the market for the 
search for the second innovation is perfectly competitive with free entry, facilitated by 
common knowledge of the essential idea revealed by the patent on the first invention.
6 
Following the tradition established by Loury (1979) and Lee and Wilde (1980), we assume 
each firm in the race chooses a Poisson hazard rate λ ∈ R
+ for a successful innovation and 
the marginal cost of λ is assumed to be constant at c.
7 To facilitate the analysis of this 
model, we also make a technical assumption that firms in the race commit investments for 
a period ∆ in advance, where ∆ may be arbitrarily small. An alternative assumption with 
equivalent implications is that there is a time lag ∆ between a successful innovation 
outcome and the arrival of this news to research administrators including competitors, 
resulting in rent dissipation during ∆ period. This is an intermediate case between Loury’s 
assumption that a one-time initial investment generates a perpetual flow of research effort 
insensitive to the evolution of incentives, and Lee and Wildes’ flow-cost model that 
assumes λ is an instantaneously variable input, ruling out competitive rent dissipation via 
research duplication. 
                                                                                                                                              
invention.   
6 If a fixed cost is required for the second innovation, a finite number of firms compete for the innovation and 
the innovation cannot be achieved instantaneously, as shown in lemma 1 in section 3 below. However, 
qualitative results remain the same with the inclusion of fixed cost. 
7 This assumption of constant marginal cost greatly simplifies the analysis, and also maximizes the possible 
waste engendered by patent race. The models by Green and Scotchmer (1995), Chang (1995), or Denicolo 
(1999) implicitly assume a constant cost of innovation.  
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The research tool does not directly produce any consumer good. Its flow value is v 
per period, accruing indirectly as a result of a reduction in the cost of a consumption good 
after achievement of the second innovation. To remove the static inefficiency of the patent 
monopoly addressed by Nordhaus as a reason for limitation of patent life, we assume a 
perfectly inelastic demand curve for the consumer good, with zero income effect. To focus 
on the dynamics of the innovation process itself, we assume the level of intertemporal 
demand is static, in contrast to Barzel (1968) who assumes a growing demand with 
increasing population. 
Though, there are infinitely many ways of attempting to achieve the second 
innovation, we assume there are no substitute innovations. That is, the scope of a patent is 
assumed infinite in the sense that the patent cannot be “invented around” by producing a 
substitute during the protected period. Thus, an invention patented at time zero is fully 
protected till the end of the patent life, T, and a licensing agreement is required for 
commercialization of the second innovation before T. This assumption contrasts with some 
models with finite patent scope in which the second innovator effectively “invents around” 
the first and provides a substitute with lower production cost or other superior attributes, 
rendering the first patent obsolete (O’Donoghue 1998, Hopenhayn and Mitchell 2001). In 
their models, delay of the second innovation increases the first inventor’s expected profit 
by extending her stream of revenue,
8 while in our model the delay reduces the expected 
profit because the expected stream of licensing revenue is shorter and starts later. 
                                                 
8 If no value is directly accrued from the first invention, as in the case of research tool, the expected profit of 
the first invention is zero in those studies.  
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Many types of ex post licensing arrangements are plausible for commercialization 
of the second innovation. One simple method is for the successful second innovator to pay 
an up-front fee to the first inventor for the right to use her patent until expiration. Another 
method, equivalent in our model, is to pay a share of the second innovator’s revenue 
during the first patent period as a “running royalty.” Potential second innovators can adjust 
the timing of their entry into the innovation race according to the level of the royalty. For 
purpose of exposition, our model assumes a running royalty, and the royalty rate is α ∈ [0, 
1], the share of the revenue flow transferred from the second to the first inventor. Firms are 
assumed to be risk-neutral, and the discount rate is r. 
 
2.2. LICENSING EQUILIBRIUM 
The ex ante, exclusive licensing agreement addressed in the two-firm world of 
Green and Scotchmer is not feasible in an environment with atomistic competitive 
potential licensees. However, if only a single firm can participate in the second round 
innovation, ex ante agreement is a definite possibility. In this study, we focus on ex post 
licensing agreement in a competitive and monopolistic patent race, but the case of ex ante 
agreement in a monopolistic market structure is briefly considered in section 5 below. 
Suppose that the second innovation is developed before the first patent expires. The 
first patent holder can block commercialization of the second innovation until her patent, 
received at date zero, expires at date T. The second patent holder can similarly block 
commercialization of his innovation (by the first patent holder), awarded at date t and 
expiring at t + T. Thus, the second innovation is vulnerable to the “double-holdup” 
problem (Merges and Nelson), preventing it from being utilized without a licensing  
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agreement. But, if the gains from an agreement are greater than the status quo, both patent 
holders have strong incentive to arrange a licensing agreement. If a running royalty system 
is adopted, the surplus to be divided is the flow gross value v from the date of issue of the 
second patent (assumed identical to the date of discovery) until T, the date of expiration of 
the first patent. Assuming Nash bargaining with equal bargaining power, the solution is a 
50-50 share of v until date T: that is, α = 0.5.  
There can be cases (e.g., when the innovation is expensive to develop) in which the 
first inventor would prefer to make a credible offer of a lower royalty rate (say, α < 0.5) to 
render the second innovation more attractive to potential innovators. Under an infinite 
patent life, however, competitive innovators who anticipate a fifty percent share of revenue 
will not pursue the second innovation if the profit margin from the innovation is less than 
the present value of costs. An ex ante royalty rate below fifty percent, proclaimed 
unilaterally by the first inventor, is not credible ex post, because the first patent holder can 
renegotiate the royalty rate to fifty percent. The ex post royalty rate is thus 0.5, 
independent of the innovation cost. However, even if the royalty rate α stays at its 
equilibrium level of 0.5 and the expected cost is more than half the gross expected present 
value of the innovation, a second innovation with positive expected net social value can be 





3.  COMPETITIVE INNOVATION MARKET AND OPTIMAL PATENT LIFE 
3.1. HAZARD RATE AND TIMING OF THE SECOND INNOVATION 
Assuming the first patent is received at date zero, if the second innovation is made t 
periods after the first patent, the expected present value of the innovation, net of royalty, is 
 
0 () ( 1 )
Tt T rr
Tt Vt v e d v e d
− −τ −τ
− =− α τ + τ ∫∫ .    (1) 
During the overhang period till the first patent expires, the successful second 
innovator receives the flow revenue v net of the royalty fee to the first patent holder (the 
first term on the right hand side (RHS) of equation (1)). Beyond the overhang, the full 
revenue flow accrues to him until his own patent expires (the second term). The expected 
revenue of the second innovation depends on the period of overhang from the first patent, 
and the main decision by potential innovators is the timing of their entry into the race. The 
following lemma characterizes the timing and the intensity (or hazard rate) of the second 
innovation: 
Lemma 1: Hazard rate of the second innovation under competition 
Assume the expected net present value of the innovation to the second innovator 
V(t) exceeds the flow cost of search c. In the limit as the cost commitment period ∆ 
approaches zero, if the second innovation has not yet been achieved, it is made 
instantaneously at date t and the expected profits are completely dissipated through 
competition. 
Proof. Consider a decision at date t for V(t) ≥ c. When n identical firms compete for 
an innovation, the industry-wide expected cost of the innovation, under the assumption of 
∆-period commitment, is  
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The expected cost consists of the search cost incurred till a successful innovation 
and the extra cost incurred during an additional period ∆ due to, for example, delayed news 
of a successful innovation.
9 The expected profit, evaluated at date t, is 
()
0
() ( 1 )
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With free entry, the zero profit condition yields the following industry hazard rate: 























since  ( ) 1
r er
−∆≅− ∆  for a small ∆. Thus, as the commitment period ∆ goes to zero, the 
industry hazard rate nλ approaches infinity and the time before the innovation succeeds 
goes  to  zero  almost  surely.          Q.E.D.   
If the expected net present value V(t) is lower than the constant cost c, firms will 
delay investment until the value exceeds the cost. Lemma 1 implies that at t = t
* where t
* = 
inf{V(t) ≥ c: t∈ R
+}, firms rush into the race and the innovation is, in the limit, made 
instantaneously.
10 Potential rents from the innovation are completely dissipated through 
                                                 
9 For expositional purpose, we assume the search cost starts to incur from date ∆ and is discounted back to 
time zero (the first term on the RHS), and the extra cost is incurred during the period [0, ∆] (the second 
term). 
10 This derivation of an infinite hazard rate in our model of innovation is similar to the idea of an infinite 
exploration rate in a model of exploitation of exhaustible resource. Arrow and Chang (1982) claim without  
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competition. Though the fixed-cost model of Loury could explain rent dissipation, it does 
not allow for an instantaneous innovation; there is a fixed expected delay between resource 
commitment at the start of a race and the discovery of innovation, regardless of the 
intensity of innovative activity. On the other hand, Lee and Wilde’s model of flow 
investment can explain instantaneous second innovation, but there is no rent dissipation in 
their model. Lemma 1 shows that our model with ∆-commitment can explain both rent 
dissipation and instantaneous innovation. 
Given a first invention patented (and revealed) at t = 0, the timing of the second 
innovation is easily calculated. To simplify the exposition, we define the marginal cost of 
λ as a fraction of gross value of the innovation; i.e., c ≡ kv/r, where k ∈ [0, 1] is the cost 
coefficient. The expected profit function of the second innovation is defined as 
 
() () () ( 1 )
rT t r T v
tV tc e e k
r
−− −  π= − = − α + α − −  .    (2) 
If the marginal cost is lower than the expected value when a firm makes an 
innovation immediately after the first patent (c ≤ V(0) or  (1 )(1 )
rT ke
− ≤− α− ), then the 
second innovation follows immediately at date t = 0. On the other hand, if the marginal 
cost of search exceeds the value of the second innovation when it is introduced after the 
expiration of the first patent (c > V(T) or  1
rT ke
− >− ), the second innovation will never be 
made. For an intermediate range of marginal cost ((1 )(1 ) (1 )
rT rT eke
−− −α − < ≤ − ), the 
second innovation is made within the first patent life at time t
* when the expected profit is 
zero. In the limit as ∆ goes to zero, the timing of the second innovation is summarized as: 
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∞< ≤ 
. (3) 
Figure 1 shows the timing of the second innovation under different levels of cost, 
when patent life is fixed at T. It shows that the timing under a competitive innovation race 
(the solid line) is a non-decreasing function of the marginal cost (or the cost coefficient k). 
Proposition 1 examines how the timing is affected by a change in patent life. 
Figure 1--Timing of the second innovation 









Cost as fraction of gross value   
Proposition 1: Patent life and timing of the second innovation 
Given a first invention patented at t = 0, an increase in patent life from T advances 
the timing of the second innovation 
*() tT if the marginal cost of search for the second 
innovation is in an intermediate range, (1 )(1 ) (1 )
rT ek
− −α − < ≤ −α .  
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Proof. Total differentiation of equation (2) for t = t
*, where 0 < t












A longer patent life increases the expected revenue of the second innovation by 
lengthening the stream of revenue from the innovation, resulting in earlier innovation (the 
first term on the RHS). On the other hand, the net revenue decreases with a longer patent 
life because the period of royalty payment to the first patent holder is lengthened (the 
second term). When the cost of the innovation is in the intermediate range 
(1 )(1 ) (1 )
rT ek
− −α − < ≤ −α , the first effect dominates the second and a longer patent life 
induces earlier second innovation. For a high cost (1 1
rT ke
− −α< < − ), the second effect 
dominates the first and a longer patent life delays the second innovation. When the cost is 
sufficiently low ( (1 )(1 )
rT ke
− <− α− ), the second innovation is instantaneous and change 
in patent life does not affect the timing of innovation. Thus, the effect of patent life on the 
timing of the second innovation is summarized as: 
* 0 0( 1 ) ( 1)
0 (1 )(1 ) (1 )












= ≤≤− α −
< −α − < ≤ −α 
> −α < ≤ − 
. Q.E.D. 
Existing studies on sequential innovations argue that long patent life always 
discourages incentive for subsequent innovations, but proposition 1 demonstrates the 
possibility of the opposite case. If the cost of the second innovation is not large, the size of 
a longer stream of revenue due to a longer patent life dominates the size of a longer 
payment of royalty fee to the first patent holder and the second innovation is advanced.  
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The possibility of licensing the first invention within its patent period makes this result 
possible.
11 
If the cost of innovation is high (k > 1 – α) and the patent life is set as infinite, the 
expected value is less than the cost and the second innovation will not be made. Though 
the first patent holder has a strong incentive to induce the second innovation by lowering 
the royalty rate, he cannot credibly guarantee a low royalty rate due to the assumed 
absence of commitment capacity against ex post renegotiation once the R&D investment 
for the second innovation is sunk. Instead, if government sets a finite patent life, any 
second innovation that offers a positive profit stream at that patent life, net of marginal 
cost, will be pursued by competitive innovators at some time before (or at) the end of the 
life of the first patent. A finite patent life T provides a credible commitment to potential 
second innovators that the first inventor’s royalty revenue (or share of the value of the 
second innovation) will definitely decline with time, to zero at t = T. This indicates that 
society may be better off with a finite patent life since it can induce, otherwise unavailable, 
second innovation. 
 
3.2. SOCIAL WELFARE AND OPTIMAL PATENT LIFE 
The social welfare under a competitive innovation race is expressed as 
  ()
** *( ) ()
rt rT r t T
c
vv
St e e e
rr
−− − + α
=− +.     (4) 
The first term on the RHS of equation (4) is the rent transferred to the first patent 
holder from the start of the second innovation t
* until the end of the first patent T. The 
                                                 
11 However, this result does not necessarily imply that the patent life should be infinite within this range of  
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second term is the consumers’ surplus accrued after the expiration of the second patent, at 
t
* + T. The rent to the successful second innovator, net of royalty fee to the first patent 
holder, is completely dissipated through free entry. The level of social welfare for different 





















if k k e
r
ve k








  α+ −α   ≤≤ ≡ − α −

 α−  =< ≤ ≡ − 





The solid line in Figure 2, Sc(T), indicates the level of social welfare under 
competition when patent life is finite at T.
12 For  2 0 kk <≤ , as the cost decreases from k2 
the potential rent from the innovation increases but this rent is completely dissipated with 
free entry. Only a share of the rent transferred to the first patent holder as royalty fee and 
consumer surplus accrued after the expiration of the second innovation constitute as social 
welfare. Since the timing of the second innovation is the same (i.e., t
* = 0) within this 
range of cost, the sizes of the royalty payment and consumer surplus are constant and so is 
social welfare. As the cost level increases above k2, social welfare decreases due to not 
only the higher current cost of innovation but also the delay in the second innovation. 
Social welfare drops to zero when the cost exceeds  3 1( )
rT ek
− −≡ . 
The dashed line at the bottom of figure 2, S0(T), shows the level of social welfare 
when there is no possibility of licensing, as assumed by Horowitz and Lai. The race for the 
                                                                                                                                              
cost. See proposition 2 below. 
12 The parameters used in the figures are as follows: v = 1, r = 0.1, T = 20, α = 0.5.  
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second innovation starts only after the first patent expires, and without any royalty 
payment to the first patent holder all rent from the innovation is completely dissipated 
through competition. Consumer surplus after the expiration of the second patent remains 
the only term of social welfare in this case. However, if a licensing agreement is allowed 
before the first patent expires, the second innovation is advanced and social welfare 
increases from S0(T) to Sc(T), for all range of cost. A mechanism that facilitates a licensing 
agreement can be welfare improving when the innovation race is competitive. 
Figure 2--Social welfare under competition 
 S0(T  





 1 – α 
 αv/r 
Sc(∞): social welfare 
           under infinite T 
Sc(T): social welfare 
          under finite T 
S0(T): social welfare 
          under finite T 




Cost as fraction of gross value   
If patent life is infinite, the second innovation is either immediately made after the 
first patent for k ≤ 1 – α or never made for k > 1 – α (the dotted line Sc(∞) in figure 2). 
With zero consumer surplus under an infinite patent life and complete rent dissipation due 
to free entry, social welfare consists only of the royalty fee transferred to the first patent 
holder. Society is better off under an infinite patent life if the cost of the second innovation  
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is in a narrow range of  ˆ k  < k < (1 – α). For most other range (i.e., k <  ˆ k  and (1 – α) < k ≤ 
k3), however, finite patent life is socially desirable since there is less rent dissipation (for a 
low cost) or the second innovation is induced (for a high cost). 
Proposition 2: Optimal patent life under perfect competition 
When the innovation race is competitive, there exists a finite patent life T
* that 
attains the maximum social welfare for all values of the cost, 0 ≤ k < 1. 
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For a low cost ( 2 0 kk ≤≤ ), the sign of ∂Sc/∂T is negative, implying that a shorter 
patent life increases social welfare. The minimum patent life that induces the second 
innovation within this range of cost is derived from the upper bound, k2: i.e., 
[]
* log (1 )/(1 ) / Tk r =− −α− −α . When the cost is in an intermediate range ( 23 kk k <≤), 
the sign of ∂Sc/∂T depends on the level of k: i.e., positive for  2 (1 ) kk <<− α  and negative 
for  3 (1 ) kk −α < ≤ . Thus, the optimal patent life is derived from the lower bound k2 for 
2 (1 ) kk <<− α  and from the upper bound k3 for  3 (1 ) kk −α < ≤ . For a very high cost 
( 3 1 kk << ), no second innovation is made and social welfare is zero regardless of patent 
life.
13 The patent life that maximizes social welfare is summarized as: 
                                                 
13 Though patent life doesn’t affect social welfare within this range of cost, the minimum patent life derived 
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. (6)  Q.E.D. 
Figure 3--The effect of research cost on optimal patent life 
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Proposition 2 illustrates that finite patent life is socially optimal for most range of 
cost, in a sequential context. When the cost of innovation is low (0 (1 )(1 )
rT ke
− <≤− α − ), 
a finite short patent life reduces the common pool problem associated with excessive 
competition, without delaying the innovation. Similarly, for a high cost (k  >1 – α), a finite 
patent life provides a credible commitment that the first patent holder will not exploit the 
innovation and thus induces the second innovation. When the cost is in an intermediate 
level ((1 )(1 ) 1
rT ek
− −α − < ≤ −α), proposition 1 shows that the second innovation is 
advanced with a longer patent life. However, as patent life increases, the marginal loss  
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from delayed incidence of consumer surplus dominates the marginal gain from earlier 
second innovation, and there exists a finite patent life that maximizes social welfare within 
this range of cost. Figure 3 illustrates that the optimal life correspondence admits a finite 
optimal patent life for all range of k (except when k = 1).
14 
Figure 4--Sensitivity of social welfare under alternative patent lives 
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While the optimal patent life is highly variable for an intermediate range of cost in 
figure 3, it turns out the actual level of social welfare is not so sensitive to the choice of 
patent life. Figure 4 shows the level of social welfare as a function of patent life under 
different values of cost k, similar to the graph by Nordhaus (figure 5.6, p. 83).
15 When k = 
0.49, the patent life that maximizes social welfare is T2 = 39.13 years. However, at least 
half the possible social welfare from a sub-optimally chosen patent life is attained as long 
                                                 
14 When k = 1 – α, social welfare is constant, regardless of the level of patent life. The minimum patent life 
that induces the second innovation, however, is finite as indicated in figure 3.  
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as the patent life is longer than T1 (= 7.14 years). Similarly, for k = 0.51, the optimal patent 
life is T1 = 7.14 years and other patent lives that are longer than this level have only a 
minor impact on the social welfare. This implies that the current system of a finite patent 
life is self-selective in that firms can adjust their timing of investment to mitigate the 
research distortion cause by a patent. 
 
4.  MONOPOLISTIC INNOVATION MARKET AND OPTIMAL PATENT LIFE 
4.1. TIMING OF THE SECOND INNOVATION  
Now, consider a situation where only a single firm (possibly the first inventor) can 
pursue the second innovation. For example, if a single firm has an asset that is a “crucial 
complement” to the first invention, only that firm can develop the follow-on innovation as 
a monopolist. The first patent holder is likely to identify the single potential second 
innovator before an investment is made, and ex ante licensing agreement is plausible. In 
this section, however, we focus on the case of ex post agreement to compare it with the 
case of competition in the previous section. The ex ante agreement will be considered in 
section 5.  
Lemma 2: Hazard rate of the second innovation under monopoly 
Assuming a positive rent and a constant cost of innovation, as the commitment 
period ∆ approaches zero, the second innovation occurs instantaneously when the 
monopolist makes an investment. 
Proof. The monopolist’s expected profit under the assumption of ∆-period 
commitment, evaluated at date t, is 
                                                                                                                                              
15 In figure 4, we consider the cost of innovation as k = (1 – α) ± ε, where α = 0.5 and ε = 0.01.  
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The first order condition to maximize the expected profit yields 
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since  ( ) 1
r er
−∆≅− ∆  for a small ∆. Assuming V(t) ≥ c, as ∆ approaches zero the 
monopolist’s hazard rate λ approaches infinity: that is,  ∞ = λ
→ ∆ 0 lim .    Q.E.D. 
Like the case of competition in lemma 1, lemma 2 implies that the innovation is 
made instantaneously once the monopolist starts to make an investment. The difference is, 
however, that the hazard rate is of smaller order under monopoly (though it approaches 
infinity), so the monopolist can capture positive rent.  
Without any threat of entry or competition, the monopolist can delay his investment 
even when the expected value exceeds the cost. The monopolist’s expected profit is 
  
() () ( 1 )
rt rT r T t v
tk e e e
r
−− − +  π= − α − + α −  .    (7) 
The timing of investment to maximize the monopolist’s expected profit is derived from the 
first order condition of equation (7). 
 
(1 ) 0
rt rT ve k e
t
−− ∂π  =− − α − + =  ∂
  
The first order condition shows the timing of investment is independent of the 
period of overhang from the first patent. That is, the monopolist decides to invest either at 
time t = 0 when the sign of ∂π/∂t is negative or at time t = T when it is positive. The timing 
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.       ( 8 )  
Figure 1 shows that the second innovation is (weakly) delayed under monopoly 
(the dotted line) compared to the competition (the solid line), and the delay is longer when 
the cost is in an intermediate range (say,  12 kk k <<). Within this range of cost, the second 
innovation is made immediately after the first patent under competition because the 
expected rent is positive and firms rush into the innovation race. Under monopoly, 
however, the second innovation is delayed until the first patent is expired because delayed 
entry maximizes the monopolist’s profit. This implies that ex ante agreement is not only 
likely to be more feasible if there is only one firm that can innovate in the second round; it 
is more important for the first inventor’s profit. The second innovator has a bargaining 
advantage in the negotiation of ex ante agreement when earlier introduction of this 
innovation is jointly profitable. As the cost increases from k2, the second innovation is 
delayed even under competition due to higher cost of innovation, and the difference in 
timing due to structure of the innovation market gradually vanishes.  
 
4.2. THE OPTIMAL PATENT LIFE  
The social welfare under monopoly consists of the monopolist’s rent (equation (7)) 
as well as the consumers’ surplus and royalty fee transferred to the first patent holder 
(equation (4)).  
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The solid line in Figure 5, Sm(T), indicates the social welfare under second round 
monopoly and ex post licensing, for a given finite patent life. As the cost increases from 
zero, social welfare decreases due to reduced monopoly rent associated with higher R&D 
cost. When the cost reaches k1, social welfare drops down because the second innovation is 
suddenly delayed from t = 0 to t = T. With this delay, the royalty fee to first patent holder 
becomes zero and the present value of the monopolist’s rent is substantially reduced, 
resulting in lower social welfare. Social welfare again drops to zero when the R&D cost is 
too high to induce any innovation (k > k3).  
Compared to the welfare under competition (the dotted line Sc(T) in figure 5), social 
welfare under monopoly is smaller when the cost of innovation is high ( 23 kk k <<) due to 
delayed second innovation. However, for a relatively low cost of innovation (k < k2), 
monopoly can be better than competition. With immediate second innovation under both 
market structures but no rent dissipation under monopoly, social welfare under monopoly 
is larger by the size of the monopolist’s rent. Monopoly prevents the common pool 
problem of competitive innovation race without significantly delaying the innovation. This 
implies that if the first inventor can efficiently make the second innovation (i.e., with a low 
cost), it can be welfare-improving to grant exclusive monopoly rights to the first inventor  
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even if there are many competitors for the second innovation, as proposed by Kitch’s 
(1977) “prospect theory.” 
Figure 5--Social welfare under monopoly 
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Under monopoly, figure 5 shows that infinite patent life can bring a larger social 
welfare than finite patent life (Sm(∞) vs. Sm(T)) for an intermediate range of cost (k1 < k < 1 
– α).
16 Within this range of cost, a longer patent life advances the second innovation from 
T to zero and social welfare increases. However, as the patent life goes to infinity, the 
lower bound of the cost, k1, approaches 1 – α, and the range where infinite patent life 
dominates vanishes. This implies that the optimal patent life under monopoly is finite, as 
proposition 3 shows. 
                                                 
16 Given an infinite patent life (and assuming all potential innovators have similar innovative capacity), the 
social welfare under monopoly (Sm(∞)) is never less than the welfare under competition (Sc(∞)) because rent 
dissipation is avoided under monopoly for k < (1 – α).  
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Proposition 3: Optimal patent life under monopoly 
Under a monopolistic innovation market, there exists a finite patent life 
m T  that 
maximizes social welfare. 
Proof. Total differentiation of equation (9) with respect to patent life yields: 















∂  =− − <≤ 
∂  <≤ 
.  
For a low cost ( 1 0 kk ≤≤), the second innovation is immediately made after the 
first patent and the society is indifferent to the length of patent life. The minimum patent 
life that induces the second innovation is derived from the upper bound k1: i.e., 
( ) log 1 / m Tk r =− −α− . For an intermediate range of cost ( 13 kk k <≤), the sign of ∂Sm/∂T 
is negative. However, the lower bound  1 (1 )
rT ke
− ≡− α −  cannot exceed (1 – α) and the 
upper bound  3 1
rT ke
− ≡−  cannot be less than (1 – α) as long as the innovation is made. 
Thus, the optimal patent life is derived from the lower bound for  1 1 kk <≤ − α  and from 
the upper bound k3 for  3 1 kk −α< ≤  (i.e.,  ( ) log 1 / m Tk r =− − ). For a very high cost 
( 3 1 kk << ), social welfare is independent of patent life and the lower bound k3 is used to 
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. (10)  Q.E.D.  
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The dashed line in figure 3 illustrates that the optimal patent life is in general 
longer under monopoly than under competition. In particular, for k < (1 – α), the 
monopolist can capture all the rent and a longer patent life can be optimal. Under 
competition, on the other hand, the innovation race completely dissipates the increased rent 
(net of royalty) caused by an increase in patent life, without significantly advancing the 
second innovation. 
 
5.  EXTENSIONS 
5.1. EX ANTE VS. EX POST LICENSING AGREEMENT 
When the second innovation race is monopolistic, the single potential second 
innovator can be easily identified before an investment is made, and an ex ante licensing 
agreement is a possible scenario. With an ex ante agreement, the first inventor shares part 
of the R&D cost of the second innovation if she wants to induce it within her patent life. 




() () ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 )
rt rT r T t v
tk e k e e
r
−− − +  π= − α− + α − −  .  
Using the same argument as before, the timing of the second innovation under an 
ex ante licensing agreement in a monopolistic market structure is summarized as: 
                                                 
17 The expected revenue from the second innovation at date t < T, is 
() (1 )
rt rt r t T ve e e
−− − + −α +α −   . The 
expected R&D cost borne by the second innovator is the total R&D cost ( /
rt kver
− ) minus the R&D cost 
shared by the first inventor during the overhang period ( /
rt rT kv ee r
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By sharing the R&D cost with the first inventor, the second innovator receives a 
larger profit and the innovation is advanced accordingly. The timing of the second 
innovation under ex ante agreement is similar to that of ex post agreement, except that the 
range of the cost with an immediate innovation is broader under ex ante agreement. The 
assumption of “no delay between two innovations” by Green and Scotchmer can be 
justified when the cost of the second innovation is not high ( 1 0
a kk << ) in our model. 
Figure 6 compares the social welfare under ex ante agreement with the welfare 
under ex post agreement. As the cost increases from zero, social welfare under ex post 
agreement (the solid line) suddenly drops at k = k1 due to delay of the second innovation 
till the first patent expires. However, if an ex ante agreement is allowed, delay of the 
second innovation does not occur until the R&D cost reaches  1
a k  due to the sharing of the 
R&D cost with the first inventor. For  11
a kk k << , the second innovation is advanced to t = 
0 from t = T with an ex ante agreement. For a very cheap innovation ( 1 0 kk <<) or a very 
expensive one ( 1
a kk > ), however, the benefit of cost sharing from an ex ante agreement 
disappears since the date of introduction of the second innovation is independent of the 
timing of a licensing agreement.  
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Figure 6--Social welfare under monopoly: ex ante vs. ex post agreements 
 
0 
   v/r 
Social welfare 
k1   1–α   k3  k = 1  k1
a 
Social welfare 
(ex post licensing) 
Social welfare 
(ex ante licensing) 
Cost as fraction of gross value   
 
5.2. IMPLICATION OF THE 18-MONTH PERIOD PUBLICATION 
In most countries, patent applications are made public 18 months after the 
application is filed, and the U.S. patent system began to follow this rule beginning in 
2000.
18 Before this change, information of a patent application in the U.S. was not 
published until the patent was granted. One of the reasons for this new rule was to expedite 
the diffusion of knowledge revealed in patent applications. With an average lag of 28 
months between patent application and grant in the U.S. (Johnson and Popp 2000), the rule 
can speed up the diffusion of patent information through early publication. However, it is 
also argued that this new rule may lead to fewer breakthrough inventions due to decreased 
                                                 
18 The American Inventors Protection Act (P.L. 106-113), which limits publication delay to 18 months unless 
application is filed only within the boundary of the US, was enacted on November 29, 1999, and took effect 
on November 29, 2000.  
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value of patent protection (Aoki and Spiegel 2001). A natural policy question from this 
debate is what would happen if the publication lag is reduced to 12 months or even zero 
month, or equivalently what is the rationale of the existence of the publication lag itself? 
Our model provides an explanation of why the publication lag, even if it is very short, is 
necessary. 
Consider an easy second innovation for which infinite potential competitors 
(including the first inventor) can immediately make it once the first invention is revealed. 
If the first patent is published without any lag, firms will immediately jump into the race 
and potential rent is completely dissipated. On the other hand, if the first patent is kept 
unpublished for a limited period (say, 18 months in the current U.S. law), then the first 
patent holder has time to exclusively develop the second innovation as a monopolist. For a 
low cost (say, 0 < k < k1, in equation (8)), the second innovation is made immediately at t = 
0 and rent dissipation is avoided when the second innovation is monopolistic through a 
limited publication lag. We can argue that the publication lag can be interpreted as a means 
of reducing common pool problem by providing a temporary monopoly power to the first 
patent holder. If the cost of the second innovation is high (k > k1), the second innovation is 
delayed under monopoly and social welfare may be reduced with a publication lag. 
However, this welfare loss from delayed innovation can be mitigated if the publication lag 
is shortened (say, from 18 months to one day).  
In an environment of asymmetric information where government does not know the 
size R&D cost for the second innovation, policymaker can improve social welfare by 
adopting a short publication lag. If the R&D cost is cheap so that the second innovation is 
instantaneous, the publication lag avoids the common pool problem without delaying the  
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innovation. On the other hand, if the second innovation is not made immediately after the 
first patent, it signals that the R&D cost is not cheap enough to induce an instantaneous 
second innovation. But, the welfare loss due to delayed innovation can be minimized by 
making the publication lag very short.
19 
 
5.3. UNCERTAIN COST  
Previous analysis showed that the implication of patent life on social welfare 
depends on the exact level of R&D cost for the second innovation. Policymakers rarely 
observe the exact level of R&D cost in practice, and they set a single patent life based on 
the expected cost. Assuming the distribution of k as a function G(k), the social welfare 
functions under competition and under monopoly are, respectively, 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) {}
23
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kk rT rT rT
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v
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The shape of the distribution function determines the level of optimal patent life 
and social welfare. If the distribution is skewed to the left (i.e., low cost), a short, finite 
patent life may maximize social welfare. However, if the cost is normally distributed so 
that the cost is likely to be in the intermediate level, then the choice of the patent life is 
delicate, as was shown in figure 3. As an example, if we assume a uniform distribution 
function, the social welfare functions are (see appendix for detailed derivations) 
                                                 
19 Of course, this argument assumes that the first invention has already been made and patented. The 
strategic patenting behavior of the first inventor under different rules is beyond the scope of this paper.  
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Equation (A6) in appendix shows that under monopoly the longer the patent life the 
higher the social welfare. However, the sign of ∂Sc/∂T for a competitive case is ambiguous 
depending on the level of patent life. Using the same parameter space as above, the 
derivatives of social welfare with respect to the patent life T are illustrated in figure 7. 
Figure 7 shows that the optimal patent life under competition is 11. 7 years. 
Figure 7--Derivative of social welfare and optimal patent life 
 













6.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have examined the role of the patent protection when granted for 
an innovation that is an essential input to further innovation in a research sequence. In a 
highly stylized two-stage model with an inelastic first invention, we have found a richness 
in the implications of patenting not evident in one-stage models or models restricted to two 
firms. We first show that a long patent life may not hinder subsequent innovation when the 
R&D cost of the innovation is not sufficiently high, in contrast to the conclusions of 
existing studies. The extra revenue from a longer patent life can dominate the longer 
stream of royalty payment associated with a longer patent life. 
The analysis also reveals benefits from patent life limitation quite distinct from 
those related to distortion in consumption (Nordhaus) or rent-seeking in innovation 
(Barzel, Wright 1983, 1984). For innovations where the gross profit margin is modest, the 
limit on patent life can induce subsequent innovation that would be precluded under 
infinite patent life. At the optimal patent life, the second innovation yields zero net profit 
and occurs on expiration of the first patent. But if the patent life is set too long, the cost in 
delay of innovation is moderated in a polar competitive innovation market because the 
subsequent innovation begins before the patent life expires. The patent life limitation acts 
as a means of (partial) commitment against excessive exploitation by the holder of the 
invention essential to further innovation. In addition, a patent on the first invention and the 
requirement for a licensing agreement can be welfare improving by limiting excessive rent 
dissipation for the second innovation when the second innovation is highly profitable.  
Another implication of this study is that social welfare is in general not sensitive to 
patent life and a finite patent system is self-selective due to firms’ ability to adjust the  
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timing of investment. As long as the patent life is set long enough to induce innovation, the 
cost of suboptimal level of patent life is minor. If the second innovation is monopolistic, 
rent dissipation due to competitive race for patents can be avoided and social welfare is 
greater than the case of competition if the second innovation is cheap. This implies that if 
the first inventor is as efficient as the competitors, endowing the first inventor with 
monopoly power in the second innovation might be welfare improving even if there exist 
many competitors (Kitch). 
The assumptions we have made here are extreme, in order to facilitate the analysis 
and exposition, but they are not crucial for the qualitative results. But we believe, based on 
numerical results not reported here, that if we introduce the possibilities of duplication in 
research, less responsive market entry by second-stage researchers, finite elasticity of 
supply of research, or finite elasticity of demand for the final product, or economically 
responsive first-period research, the model would yield similar qualitative conclusions. 
Introduction of a lag between research effort and results would lengthen optimal patent 
length in some cases, but would not otherwise change our findings on the general 
advantage of finite over infinite patent life in the patenting of innovations that are 
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